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Abstract Quantum physics has a major influence on modern computer science and commu-
nications. New quantum-based solutions continue to be proposed by researchers. However,
only a few techniques are possible to implement in practice. One of them is quantum key
distribution, which ensures the confidentiality of digital data. This article introduces a new
concept: quantum distribution of pre-shared keys. This approach provides end-users with very
secure authentication, impossible to achieve using currently-available techniques. Secure
authentication is a key requirement in virtual private networks (VPN)—popular protection in
computer networks. The authors simulated quantum-based distribution of a shared secret in a
typical VPN connection. Using a dedicated simulator, all individual steps of the quantum key
distribution process were presented. Based on the created secret, a secure IPsec tunnel in a
StrongSwan environment was established between AGH (Poland) and VSB (Czech Republic).
It allows end-users to communicate at very high security levels.
Keywords Security.Authentication.Quantumkeydistribution.Virtualprivatenetworks . IPsec
protocol
1 Introduction
Interest in quantum-based mechanisms for communications is growing rapidly. Currently,
solutions such as quantum cryptography (QC) and quantum random generators are more than
just concepts, and they are being put into practice [19]. Quantum key distribution (QKD) in
particular is a technique whose popularity continues to grow [10].
Today, end-users of network services can buy and use devices which support symmetric
encryption with QKD techniques. Devices such as Cerberis created by ID Quantique in
Switzerland [13] or QPN-8505 created by MagiQ Technologies [15] in the US are available
in the communications market. Before these devices can be widely used in communication
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networks, technical problems need to be resolved (i.e. quantum repeaters). However, this is not
the only solution to implement proprietary QKD in practice. The first services based on QKD
are starting to appear in the communications market, since service providers are building
quantum channels and deploying their own quantum devices. As a result, QKD is currently
being offered to customers as a service.
The development of quantum-based techniques may change our approach to the most
popular security services and protocols in the near future, for example the methods used to
build virtual private networks (VPN). Currently, the most popular authentication method in
VPN is asymmetric cryptography – private keys and certificates with public keys. Unfortu-
nately, this technique requires additional resources to work properly (i.e. deployed Public Key
Infrastructure), and it will be possible to crack it easily when quantum computers are created in
the future. Therefore, pre-shared keys (also known as secrets) may be the best alternative in the
near future, in particular when these secrets can be distributed securely using techniques such
as QKD. This article proposes a pre-shared key distributed using quantum methods for
authentication, and presents an implementation of this idea in practice.
The article consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 describes selected security services, such as
authentication, encryption and quantum key distribution. Chapter 3 introduces VPNs, mainly
based on the IPsec protocol. The StrongSwan environment where the practical tests were
conducted is also presented. Chapter 4 describes the implementation issues: the key generation
process in a QC simulator, and tunnel establishment using StrongSwan. Chapter 5 presents the
results of implementation: the working VPN tunnel between the AGH University of Science
and Technology (Poland) and the VSB-Technical University of Ostrava (Czech Republic).
Additionally, the effect of final key reduction was simulated and presented in detail. The final
chapter concludes the article.
2 Security services
Security services are being applied in network environments in order to protect transmitted or
stored data [20]. The services presented in this chapter are used to verify the identity of end-
users and protect confidential data. Solutions such as quantum key distribution are able to
establish secret strings of bits in a network environment at a higher security level.
2.1 Authentication
Authentication is usually the first security step used during communication between network
entities. Usually, at the start of the communication process, the end-user must present their
identity. After it is verified successfully, the end-user is authorized in the system, and they can
use specific services or resources.
The most popular authentication methods available currently are based on logins and
passwords. Each end-user has an individual identity in the system, known as a login. The
end-user also needs to know a confidential string of bits, known as a password or secret.
During the authentication process, the end-user presents their login and secret password. If the
presented secret is successfully verified, the end-user gains access to the system. This method
is based on the fact that only the user knows their secret password, and therefore they are able
to present it during the authentication process.
There are many different types of authentication methods based on secret passwords.
During one such process, known as the challenge-response method, one entity presents a
question (known as a ‘challenge’) and another entity must provide a valid answer (known as a
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‘response’). This response is usually based on a secret password, also known as a pre-shared
key. In a typical scenario, one user sends to another a randomly-generated string of bits as the
challenge, whereupon the receiver must return the result of a cryptographic function. This
response is computed using the challenge as the input of the cryptographic function and the
secret as the key. An example of such a function is a keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC). If both entities share the same secret, they are able to compute the response. At
the same time, an intruder is not able to provide a valid authentication, because they do not
know the secret and cannot calculate the correct response.
2.2 Encryption
Encryption processes are commonly used to ensure confidentiality in modern communication
networks. The encryption transforms the message rendering it unreadable to anyone except
certain entities (i.e., the sender and the recipient). Formally, the encryption is a function E
defined by:
EK Mð Þ ¼ C
where M denotes a message (plaintext), C denotes a ciphered message (ciphertext) and K is
the key. In symmetric-key cryptography, the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt
confidential data, therefore the key must be secret [8]. In modern ciphers, the key is a long
string of bits. The distribution or agreement of these strings is crucial to data confidentiality.
Currently used algorithms (e.g., Diffie–Hellman key agreement protocol [21]) are able to
establish a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel, although they are
vulnerable to some types of attacks. The best currently-available methods of establishing secret
keys in a secure way are quantum key distribution methods.
2.3 Quantum key distribution
Secure distribution or agreement of encryption keys are crucial to data confidentiality.
Currently, when we use modern ciphers with popular key distribution methods, we are not
sure if an intruder is eavesdropping on the communication. In this way, a hidden intruder can
scan the network and obtain sensitive data. Quantum key distribution ensures a very high level
of security, because it is not possible to eavesdrop on the communication in a passive way [1].
If an eavesdropper reads the distributed key, this will change the quantum states of the photons
and will thus be revealed. This is possible because measurement influences the quantum state
[6], and it is not possible to clone an unknown quantum state [24].
Popular quantum key distribution protocols, such as BB84 [3], are based on the polarization
of single photons, which carry information coded in quantum states (i.e. different polarizations:
vertical, horizontal, diagonal). In this way, the recipient and potential eavesdropper do not
know which detector should be used to measure the polarization precisely. It is not a problem
for the intended recipient – when they announce the configuration of detector which was used
during the measurement of a received photon, the sender confirms that the obtained result is
correct or asks for this bit to be deleted from the final key because they obtained result is not
certain.
What about eavesdropping on a quantum distributed key? If the eavesdropper chooses an
inappropriate detector to perfectly measure the polarization, the polarization of the photon is
changed. The sender and recipient uncover the eavesdropper if they compare parts of the
obtained key, thus rendering passive eavesdropping impossible. If someone wants to
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eavesdrop on photons and read confidential information, they would need to change the
quantum states of the photons.
Quantum key distribution ensures a very high level of security [11]. However, it is only part
of the complete key establishment process [17]. For example, the sender and recipient must
estimate errors in the distributed key by computing the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER). The
QBER is defined as the ratio of the number of wrong bits to the total number of bits. It is worth
emphasizing that not only eavesdropper is responsible for introducing errors; they may occur
because of disturbance in the quantum channel, optical misalignment, noise in detectors, and
so on.
After the bit error estimation, two users, referred to as Alice and Bob, use key distillation
protocols. These protocols usually involve two steps:
& key reconciliation—in this step the sender and recipient must find and correct or delete
errors [2, 12],
& privacy amplification—the sender and recipient should improve their privacy and con-
struct the final key by deleting some of the distributed bits [4, 5].
& Bit error estimation and key distillation processes are able to effective manage the security
and efficiency in quantum cryptography [16].
3 Virtual private networks
A virtual private network (VPN) is a means to securely and privately transmit data over an
unsecured and shared network infrastructure. VPNs secure the transmitted data by encapsu-
lating the data, encrypting the data, or both encapsulating and then encrypting the data.
Encapsulation is often referred to as tunneling because data is transmitted from one network
to another transparently across a public network infrastructure. Typically, a VPN is a protected
connection between two entities (specific devices or particular networks) that are not neces-
sarily directly connected.
A good VPN solution should address all of the following issues:
& Protecting data from eavesdropping by using encryption.
& Protecting packets from tampering by using hash functions to ensure packet integrity.
& Protecting against man-in-the-middle attacks by using identity authentication mechanisms.
& Protecting against replay attacks by using sequence numbers when transmitting protected
data.
& Defining the mechanics of how data is encapsulated and protected, and how protected
traffic is transmitted between devices.
& Defining what traffic actually needs to be protected.
The most important types of VPN technologies are currently IPsec, SSL, GRE, MPLS
VPN, PPTP, and L2TP. We employed the widely-used IPsec technology within the experiment
described in this paper.
3.1 IPsec protocol
IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) VPNs encrypt data at the network layer of the OSI reference
model, offering secure VPN solution by providing authentication, data confidentiality, anti-
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replay protection and data integrity protection. IPsec is one of the most popular VPN
technologies used by the commercial sector, service providers, and government networks.
IPsec is a standards-based protocol, and therefore it supports interoperability across products
from multiple vendors. The IPsec framework is defined in RFC 2401, although the imple-
mentation of IPsec is defined in several different RFC recommendations.
IPsec provides the following services [9]:
& Data confidentiality: This is achieved via encryption to protect data from eavesdropping
attacks. Supported encryption algorithms include DES, 3DES, and AES.
& Data integrity: This is accomplished via HMAC functions to verify that packets have not
been tampered with and are being received from a valid peer, preventing man-in-the-
middle attacks or session hijacking attacks. Supported HMAC functions include MD5 and
SHA.
& Anti-replay protection: This is achieved by including encrypted sequence numbers in data
packets to ensure that a replay attack does not occur from a man-in-the-middle device.
& Peer authentication: This is done to ensure that before data is transmitted between peers,
the peers’ identities are verified. Device authentication is supported with symmetric pre-
shared keys, asymmetric pre-shared keys, and digital certificates. Remote access connec-
tions also support user authentication using XAUTH (Extended Authentication).
The two main groups of standards that IPsec uses are [9]:
& ISAKMP (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol)/IKE (Internet
Key Exchange): These standards are used to set up secure management connections,
determine keying information for encryption, and using signatures for authentication of
the management connection. This connection is used so the two IPsec peers can share
IPsec messages with each other.
& AH (Authentication Header) and ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload): These standards
are used to provide protection for user data. They can provide confidentiality (only ESP),
data integrity, data origin authentication, and anti-replay services.
IPsec does not support encapsulation of multicast and broadcast IP packets and all other
non-IP packets. In this case, the GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation) protocol is used to
encapsulate these packets and to create unicast packets that can be encapsulated by IPsec
afterwards.
3.2 StrongSwan software
The StrongSwan software package [23] provides an open-source IPsec VPN solution.
StrongSwan is intended primarily for Linux devices. It is fully compatible with other standard
IPsec VPN implementations, and thus can be used in networks with mixed equipment.
The main benefits of StrongSwan IPsec VPNs are as follows:
& StrongSwan supports various popular platforms—computers with the Linux, Mac OS X or
FreeBSD operating systems, and smartphones with the Android operating system.
& StrongSwan implements both IKEv1 and IKEv2 (Internet Key Exchange) protocols, and it
fully supports IPv6.
& StrongSwan enables dynamic IP address and interface updates with the IKEv2 Mobility
and Multihoming Protocol, and IKEv2 Multiple Authentication Exchanges.
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& It enables automatic insertion and deletion of IPsec policy-based firewall rules.
& StrongSwan supports NAT-Traversal via UDP encapsulation and port floating.
& The XAUTH functionality is based on IKEv1 Main Mode authentication.
& The device authentication is based on X.509 certificates or pre-shared keys.
& StrongSwan enables secure IKEv2 EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) user
authentication.
& RSA private keys and certificates can be stored on smart cards or USB tokens supporting
the PKCS #11 interface.
4 Implementation
In this chapter, the practical implementation of a VPN tunnel between AGH (Poland) and VSB
(Ostrava) is described. The first step is the key generation process to ensure the secure pre-
shared key at both ends of the tunnel. The key – generated in a QKD simulator – is used during
the authentication process. This step differs from such implementations as in SECOQC project
[19] or commercial deployments [10] where physical devices were used in the network
scenarios. Following successful authentication, an IPsec tunnel is established, and all data
transmitted between users is transmitted securely.
4.1 Key generation
To generate the secure pre-shared key, the authors used the QKD Protocol Simulator applica-
tion written in C++ [18]. The simulator implements all steps of the BB84 protocol, as well as
error estimation, key reconciliation, and privacy amplification. The application provides
detailed logs to report all performed steps, which makes it possible to analyze the QKD
protocol.
At the start of the key generation process, the QKD protocol (BB84—the most popular
protocol in practice) and the length of the key (1024 bits) were selected. The key is as follows:
——————————STARTING KEYS———————————
Original key - 1024 bits:
0100000111011100111000101101111010001101000100100
011110001111111110001000000010000111000111010000000100011
0001000010011000111010000111000111010101000101110
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
1110000000111100011100000110101001010100101101101111
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1000010001111100000100100100111010001111000001111
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
101000010011010011111110110010010001011100101110
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0111101111000001010110101110000011011000000000111
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
001100111011010100110001100001010100100101111000
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0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
00110101101011000011010010101011000010011001010011001100010001
010010001100111000010110110100010101000000110010111110101010
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0010010111011110100101011101101010001
Next, a quantum channel with 1 % noise intensity was modeled, providing some errors in
the starting key. The following mask was used in the process (ones indicate the locations where
individual bits of the starting key were changed):
————————CHANNEL MODEL - NOISE ———————————
Mask for introducing noise:
M:
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
10000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0000000010000000000000
Once the errors were inserted into the starting key, the BB84 protocol commenced. Alice
and Bob performed all the steps of the BB84 protocol to obtain 512-bit raw keys:
———————— QUANTUM PROTOCOL ———————————
Raw keys 512 bits:
Alice:
111111101110101010010101011001001110011000100001000100
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
011010111010001111000110000100000111000001010110
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01110000111001010000001111010100111111010010010010
0011011101111110010101110001100101100001000111100
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
01110001011101011001011110110100110100000000100100
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
110001000011100110101110101101101001
Bob:
1111111011101010100101010110010011100110001000011001001100
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
110011110001000011100110101110101101101001
Now, Alice and Bob must check whether the raw key was eavesdropped. They estimate the
QBER using the 204 bits (known as the ‘sample key’). It should be noted that the real QBER is
approx. 0.96%, but the calculatedQBER is larger (approx. 1.96%).However such a value ofQBER
is normal in practical quantum channels, therefore Alice and Bob decide that the raw key is secure.
———————— QBER ESTIMATION ———————————
Sample keys - 204 bits
Raw keys (without sample) 308 bits:
Alice:
111111111000110010100010000010110000111110100100010000
1001010100110010100011000101100111011101000000110111001
0010110111110101110001010110000011001010000010110100000
000000001111111010000001011000100100010100010010
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
11101010100000100000110001010101010001110111001001011011101
Bob:
111111111000110010100010000010110000111110100100
0100001001010100110010100011000101100111011101000
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0000001011000100100010100110010110101100000000111101
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0001010101010001110111001001011011101
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General QBER: 0,9765625 %
Sample QBER: 1,96078431372549 %
Once the QBER was estimated, the raw key was shortened to 308 bits. Because of errors
provided in the channel, the keys were not the same. Therefore, the key reconciliation process
was started:
———————— RECONCILIATION ———————————
Input QBER: 0,00324675324675325
Round 1
Block length: 63 bits
Round 2
Block length: 126 bits
Round 3
Block length: 252 bits
QBER after round 3: 0 %
KEYS ARE THE SAME (Alice and Bob have the same key).
Using the CASCADE algorithm [7], where the parity of each block is checked (in three
rounds with different length of blocks), all errors were corrected. After this step, Alice had the
same raw key as Bob. Unfortunately, during the previous steps some information about the raw
key could be obtained by eavesdropper. Therefore, Alice and Bob perform the final step – the
privacy amplification process:
———————— PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION ———————————
Security Parameter:9
Amplified keys 292 bits:
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 01 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 11 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 00 0 1 1 1 0 0
110010011101111100000011100000001010101001000111
0010010111100100000100010110001000000110100100000
10110001111000110100110100101000100001000010110011001011101001
0011001011110000110010100111010111100110110010101110100001001
10010100000100001111101001
The final key has a length of 292 bits – significantly shorter than the staring key at the
beginning of the process. This string of bits will be used as a secure pre-shared key during the
authentication process. Since in the StrongSwan environment the keys are stored in the HEX
format, the final key was transformed into the following form:
4.2 Establishing the IPsec tunnel
The StrongSwan software was employed to create an IPsec tunnel between two computers at
VSB and AGH. The topology of the test scenario is shown in Fig. 1.
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The key generated by the QKD simulator was used as a pre-shared key for the authenti-
cation of both IPsec tunnel endpoints. The configuration of the StrongSwan software which
was used for establishing the tunnel is as follows:
ipsec.conf file
config setup
conn %default
ikelifetime=60 m
keylife=20 m
rekeymargin=3 m
keyingtries=1
ike=aes256-sha1-modp1536
esp=aes256-sha1
authby=secret
conn VSB-AGH
left=158.196.142.76
right=149.156.114.194
auto=start
ipsec.secrets file
158.196.142.76 149.156.114.194 : PSK 0x38D5DABD9473277C0 E02A
91C979045881A4163C69A5108599749978653AF36574265043E9
The first file ipsec.conf contains the configuration of the tunnel, while the second file
ipsec.secrets contains the pre-shared key used for authentication. The configuration at both
ends of the tunnel differs only in the local (left) and remote (right) IP address.
Once StrongSwan is installed on both computers and the configuration files are ready, the
environment starts. If the connection process is completed successfully, the VPN tunnel will be
ready to transmit secure data.
Fig. 1 Test topology
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5 Results
This chapter presents a summary of the obtained results. It covers basic measure-
ments and the status of the VPN tunnel created. Simulation results of the final key
during the key establishment process are also presented. The authors take into
account the effect of key reduction dependent on the noise intensity in the
quantum channel.
5.1 VPN tunnel
After starting the configured StrongSwan environment, the process creating the VPN tunnel
begins. During the experiment, the entire process took 4 s, during which a few packets were
exchanged between both computers. These packets were captured by the tcpdump packet
analyzer and are presented below.
root@ubuntu:~# tcpdump src 149.156.114.194
16:34:00.696851 IP dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl.4500 > pcn312g.vsb.cz.4500: NONESP-encap:
isakmp: child_sa inf2[I]
16:34:00.717917 IP dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl > pcn312g.vsb.cz: ICMP
dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl udp port 4500 unreachable, length 116
16:34:01.705904 IP dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl > pcn312g.vsb.cz: ICMP echo reply, id
7176, seq 137, length 64
16:34:02.707946 IP dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl > pcn312g.vsb.cz: ICMP echo reply, id
7176, seq 138, length 64
16:34:03.708830 IP dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl > pcn312g.vsb.cz: ICMP echo reply, id
7176, seq 139, length 64
16:34:03.789067 IP dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl.isakmp > pcn312g.vsb.cz.isakmp: isakmp:
parent_sa ikev2_init[I]
16:34:03.970510 IP dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl.4500 > pcn312g.vsb.cz.4500: NONESP-encap:
isakmp: child_sa ikev2_auth[I]
root@ubuntu:~# tcpdump src 158.196.142.76
16:34:00.717854 IP pcn312g.vsb.cz.4500 > dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl.4500: NONESP-encap:
isakmp: child_sa inf2[R]
16:34:01.705872 IP pcn312g.vsb.cz > dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl: ICMP echo request, id
7176, seq 137, length 64
16:34:02.707915 IP pcn312g.vsb.cz > dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl: ICMP echo request, id
7176, seq 138, length 64
16:34:03.708786 IP pcn312g.vsb.cz > dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl: ICMP echo request, id
7176, seq 139, length 64
16:34:03.946818 IP pcn312g.vsb.cz.isakmp > dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl.isakmp: isakmp:
parent_sa ikev2_init[R]
16:34:03.998277 IP pcn312g.vsb.cz.4500 > dhcp194.kt.agh.edu.pl.4500: NONESP-encap:
isakmp: child_sa ikev2_auth[R]
At the start, the ISAKMP protocol was used to provide a framework for authentication and
cryptographic key exchange. Additionally, we used IKE to establish a Security Association (SA)
to share security attributes between both ends of the VPN tunnel. Secure communi-
cation was supported by attributes including cryptographic algorithms, mode of en-
cryption, key length, etc.
Finally, the VPN connection between AGH (Poland) and VSB (Czech Republic) was
established. The details of the tunnel’s status are shown below.
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Connections:
VSB-AGH: 149.156.114.194…158.196.142.76
VSB-AGH: local: [149.156.114.194] uses pre-shared key authentication
VSB-AGH: remote: [158.196.142.76] uses any authentication
VSB-AGH: child: dynamic === dynamic
Security Associations:
VSB-AGH[3]: ESTABLISHED 89 seconds ago,
149.156.114.194[149.156.114.194]…158.196.142.76]158.196.142.76]
VSB-AGH[3]: IKE SPIs: 92c1014b8b1a478b_i 9ee4cdab07c82629_r*, pre-shared key
reauthentication in 54 minutes
VSB-AGH[3]: IKE proposal: AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA1_96/PRF_HMAC_SHA1/MODP_1536
VSB-AGH{2}: INSTALLED, TUNNEL, ESP SPIs: cd67ddfa_i c9fcb900_o
VSB-AGH{2}: AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA1_96, 0 bytes_i, 0 bytes_o, rekeying in 12 min
VSB-AGH{2}: 149.156.114.194/32 === 158.196.142.76/32
Authentication of both entities was based on the pre-shared key (generated using the
quantum cryptography method). Confidentiality of transmitted data was censured by the
AES cipher with a 256-bit key. Data was encrypted using the CBC (Cipher Block Chaining)
mode. Data integrity was protected by the SHA-1 (Secure Hash Function) algorithm.
To check whether transmitted data was protected by the IPsec protocol, the xfrm framework
for transforming encrypted packets was used. Some details are shown below:
src 149.156.114.194 dst 158.196.142.76
proto esp spi 0xcb8b7ff8 reqid 1 mode tunnel
replay-window 32 flag af-unspec
auth-trunc hmac(sha1) 0xfb3f33d2751e3382e8d5fe58a7370c3de42c97fa 96
enc cbc(aes)
0xba9c4b796edb8f2888d0f6eacce326d52d7384d2333eaeb0244c485dda228b08
src 158.196.142.76 dst 149.156.114.194
proto esp spi 0xc6db653e reqid 1 mode tunnel
replay-window 32 flag af-unspec
auth-trunc hmac(sha1) 0x202135ca11f23fce1b3ce8d48bdd16d2c4bf6b2e 96
enc cbc(aes)
0x6f642743c9ebacc20010fa9f3d433f727c078cae929bc97c0cff6b43fe5a408a
The established tunnel was built by ESP – member of the IPsec protocol suite. It provides
confidentiality (using the AES cipher), data integrity (using SHA-1) and data-origin authen-
tication. The entire original IP packet was encapsulated with a new packet header (IPsec). This
solution made it possible to build a secure path between AGH and VSB through an untrusted
network. End-users are able to use this tunnel to deliver confidential data, share joint resources
or access network services in a secure way.
5.2 Final key length
The QKD technique is a suitable candidate for securing VPNs by establishing shared keys
between end-users. This is because it provides protection against eavesdropping, and due to
the nature of the shared bits. Laws of physics mean that quantum-based generators are an
excellent source of randomness [14], therefore the established key is truly random. Addition-
ally, a dedicated quantum channel makes it possible to use long strings of bits during
authentication and enables frequent changes of keys.
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Table 1 Relationship between the value of QBER and final key length (example simulation)
QBER [%] Starting key length [bit] Final key length [bit] Keys are the same
0.00 1024 314 True
0.78 1024 310 True
1.76 1024 305 True
2.54 1024 302 True
2.73 1024 300 True
3.71 1024 295 True
4.49 1024 293 True
5.08 1024 290 True
6.05 1024 288 True
7.23 1024 284 True
8.40 1024 279 True
8.79 1024 278 True
9.57 1024 271 True
10.55 1024 267 True
11.52 1024 266 True
12.70 1024 261 True
13.48 1024 259 True
15.23 1024 252 True
15.82 1024 250 True
17.38 1024 245 True
17.77 1024 243 True
19.14 1024 238 True
19.92 1024 235 True
21.29 1024 231 True
22.07 1024 231 True
23.05 1024 228 True
24.41 1024 225 True
25.59 1024 221 True
26.37 1024 221 True
27.54 1024 0 False
28.52 1024 0 False
29.69 1024 0 False
31.25 1024 0 False
31.84 1024 0 False
33.20 1024 0 False
34.38 1024 0 False
35.35 1024 0 False
36.33 1024 0 False
37.30 1024 0 False
39.06 1024 0 False
39.65 1024 0 False
40.63 1024 0 False
41.21 1024 0 False
41.80 1024 0 False
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Unfortunately, the QKD protocols reduces the final key significantly [22]. This reduction of
key length is characteristic of all quantum key distribution protocols. For example, the original
key presented in section 4.1 had a length of 1024 bits, but after all the QC steps (error estimation,
key reconciliation, privacy amplification), the length of the final key was just 292 bits.
However, the final key length strongly depends on noise intensity in the quantum channel.
Higher levels of noise result in a higher value of QBER and a greater reduction of the key during
the key reconciliation process. A number of simulations were performed to check this relation-
ship. The authors assumed that at the start of the QKD process, Alice sends to Bob 1024 bits using
the BB84 protocol (Starting Key Length). All algorithms and parameters were similar to the QKD
process presented in section 4.1. The only difference was the QBER, which changed from 0 to
100 %. An example of results obtained is presented in Table 1 (QBER values from 0 to 50.20 %).
The simulations confirmed that the final key length (Final Key Length) strongly depends on
noise intensity in the quantum channel. However, when QBER exceeds the value of 30 %, it is
Table 1 (continued)
QBER [%] Starting key length [bit] Final key length [bit] Keys are the same
43.16 1024 0 False
43.55 1024 0 False
44.53 1024 0 False
45.31 1024 0 False
46.48 1024 0 False
47.27 1024 0 False
48.05 1024 0 False
49.02 1024 0 False
50.20 1024 0 False
Fig. 2 Reduction of final key length
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not possible to establish a final key between Alice and Bob. Therefore, almost all simulations
were conducted for QBER values below 30 %. The final results are presented in Fig. 2.
The final key varies from 314 bits (QBER=0 %) to 213 bits (QBER=30 %). The reduction
is significant (approx. 30 % difference between final keys). Therefore, this effect must be
considered when QKD techniques are used for authentication in VPNs.
6 Conclusions
Data security is one of the most important requirements today. It also poses a major challenge,
since absolute security is unreachable in practice. However, end-users of communication
services strive to apply increasingly more secure methods to protect data transmitted through
unsecure channels. One promising technology is quantum-based security, mainly using the
quantum key distribution method. The laws of physics make it possible to uncover all
eavesdroppers. Quantum cryptography is currently used to distribute encryption keys securely,
although different usages may also be proposed in the future.
This article proposes using quantum key distribution to support authentication of end-users.
The pre-shared keys – secrets which confirm the identity of end-users – can be distributed
using quantum protocols, such as the BB84 protocol. This way, the pre-shared keys are
established using the highest secure solutions available in modern communications.
The presented idea was verified in practice: an IPsec VPN tunnel was successfully
established between AGH (Poland) and VSB (Czech Republic). The authentication of both
end-users was based on a pre-shared key. This key was generated by the QKD simulator,
where the BB84 protocol, error estimation process, key reconciliation, and privacy amplifica-
tion were implemented. Additionally, authors checked the effect of final key reduction. This
reduction must be taken into account during the design process – especially, length of shared
keys using for authentication and frequency of key changing. Once the tunnel was established,
end-users were able to transmit confidential data in a secure way.
Today, VPN is a well known and widely used solution that protects digital data during
transition across a network. In the near future, development of quantum-based techniques may
well change our approach to this technique. Combining VPN and quantum key distribution
may increase security to levels unachieved by any previous solutions.
Acknowledgments This work has been partially funded by the European Union, project INDECT (Intelligent
information system supporting observation, searching and detection for security of citizens in urban environ-
ment) — grant agreement number: 218086.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which
permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are
credited.
References
1. Assche GV (2006) “Quantum Cryptography And Secret-Key Distillation”.Cambridge University Press
2. Bennett CH, Bessette F, Brassard G, Salvail L, Smolin J (1992) “Experimental quantum cryptography”. J
Cryptol 5:3–28
3. Bennett CH, Brassard CH (1984) “Public key distribution and coin tossing”. IEEE International Conference
on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing: 175–179
4. Bennett CH, Brassard G, Crepeau C, Maurer UM (1995) Generalized privacy amplification. IEEE Trans Inf
Theory 41(6):1915–1923
Multimed Tools Appl (2016) 75:10691–10707 10705
5. Bennett CH, Brassard G, Robert J (1988) “Privacy amplification by public discussion”. SIAM J Comput 17:
210–229
6. Bouwmeester D, Ekert A, Zeilinger A (2000) “The Physics of Quantum Information. Quantum
Cryptography, Quantum Teleportation, Quantum Computation”. Springer
7. Brassard G, Salvail L (1994) “Secret-key reconciliation by public discussion”. Springer-Verlag
8. Buchmann J (2004)“Introduction to Cryptography”.Springer
9. Deal R (2006) “The complete Cisco VPN configuration guide”. Cisco Press, Indianapolis
10. Dixon AR, Yuan ZL, Dynes JF, Sharpe AW, Shields AJ (2010) “Continuous operation of high bit rate
quantum key distribution”. Applied Physics Letters 96(16)
11. Ekert A, Renner R (2014) “The ultimate physical limits of privacy”. Nature 507:443–447
12. Furukawa E, Yamazaki K (2001) “Application of existing perfect code to secret key reconciliation”.
International Symposium on Communication and Information Technologies: 397–400
13. ID Quantique (IDQ) company webside. http://www.idquantique.com
14. ID Quantique White paper, “Random number generation using quantum physics” (2010)
15. MagiQ company webside. http://www.magiqtech.com
16. Niemiec M, Pach AR (2012) “The measure of security in quantum cryptography”, IEEE Global
Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM 2012)
17. Niemiec M, Pach AR (2013) “Management of security in quantum cryptography”. IEEE Commun Mag
51(8):36–41
18. Niemiec M, Romanski L, Swiety M (2011) “Quantum cryptography protocol simulator”, multimedia
communications, services and security, vol 149. Springer, Berlin, pp 286–292
19. Peev M, Poppe A, Maurhart O, Lorunser T, Langer T, Pacher C (2009) “The SECOQC quantum key
distribution network in Vienna”, European Conference on Optical Communication
20. Recommendation X.800: Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications
(1991)
21. RFC 2631: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method (1999)
22. Scarani V, Bechmann-Pasquinucci H, Cerf NJ, Dusek M, Lutkenhaus N, Peev M (2009) “The security of
practical quantum key distribution”. Rev Mod Phys 81(3):1301–1350
23. StrongSwan website. http://www.strongswan.org. Accessed 11 December 2013
24. Wootters WK, Zurek WH (1982) “A single quantum cannot be cloned”. Nature 299:802–803
Marcin Niemiec obtained his M.Sc. and Ph.D. in Telecommunications at the AGH University of Science and
Technology, Krakow, Poland, in 2005 and 2011, respectively. He has also studied at the Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid. He is an assistant professor at the Department of Telecommunications, AGH University of Science and
Technology. His research interests focus on security and data protection, in particular security services, symmetric
ciphers, cryptanalysis, malware, intrusion detection, and quantum cryptography. Co-organizer of a number of
international meetings, workshops, and conferences. He has actively participated in European Commission’s 6th
and 7th Framework Programmes (ePhoton/ONE+, BONE, SmoothIT, INDECT), Eureka-Celtic (DESYME), and
several national projects. He is the recipient of the Best Paper Award from IEEE GLOBECOM 2012. He has co-
authored over 50 publications and reports (papers, deliverables, book reviews, IETF draft, and book).
Multimed Tools Appl (2016) 75:10691–1070710706
Petr Machník received his M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in Telecommunications from VSB—Technical University
of Ostrava, Ostrava, Czech Republic in 2004 and 2008, respectively. Presently, he is an assistant professor at the
Department of Telecommunications, VSB—Technical University of Ostrava. His research activities are focused
on computer, telecommunication and wireless networks and communication security. He has participated in
several national and international research projects related to these topics, including INDECT project of the EU
7th Framework Program.
Multimed Tools Appl (2016) 75:10691–10707 10707
